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Abstract
The Bloom filter (BF) is a well-known space-efficient data structure that answers set membership queries with some
probability of false positives. In an attempt to solve many of the limitations of current inter-networking architectures,
some recent proposals rely on including small BFs in packet headers for routing, security, accountability or other
purposes that move application states into the packets themselves. In this paper, we consider the design of such in-
packet Bloom filters (iBF). Our main contributions are exploring the design space and the evaluation of a series of
extensions (1) to increase the practicality and performance of iBFs, (2) to enable false-negative-free element deletion,
and (3) to provide security enhancements. In addition to the theoretical estimates, extensive simulations of the multiple
design parameters and implementation alternatives validate the usefulness of the extensions, providing for enhanced
and novel iBF networking applications.
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1. Introduction
Since the seminal survey work by [1], Bloom fil-
ters (BF) [2] have increasingly become a fundamen-
tal data aggregation component to address performance
and scalability issues of very diverse network applica-
tions, including overlay networks [3], data-centric rout-
ing [4], traffic monitoring, and so on. In this work, we
focus on the subset of distributed networking applica-
tions based on packet-header-size Bloom filters to share
some state (information set) among network nodes. The
specific state carried in the Bloom filter varies from ap-
plication to application, ranging from secure creden-
tials [5, 6] to IP prefixes [7] and link identifiers [8], with
the shared requirement of a fixed-size packet header
data structure to efficiently verify set memberships.
Considering the constraints faced by the implemen-
tation of next generation networks (e.g., Gbps speeds,
increasingly complex tasks, larger systems, high-speed
memory availability, etc.), recent inter-networking pro-
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posals [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] chose to include more informa-
tion in the packet headers to keep pace with the increas-
ing speed and needs of Internet-scale systems. Moving
state to the packets themselves helps to alleviate sys-
tem bottlenecks (e.g., IP multicast [7], source routing
overhead [8]) and enables new in-network applications
(e.g., security [5, 6], traceback [9]) or stateless protocol
designs [11].
We refer to the BF used in this type of applications as
an in-packet Bloom filter (iBF). In a way, iBFs follow a
reverse approach compared to traditional standalone BF
implementations: iBFs can be issued, queried, and mod-
ified by multiple network entities at packet processing
time. These specific needs may benefit from additional
capabilities like element removals or security enhance-
ments. Moreover, careful BF design considerations are
required to deal with the potential effects of false pos-
itives, as every packet header bit counts and the actual
performance of the distributed system is a key goal.
In this paper, we address common limitations of
naive iBF designs and provide a practical foundation
for networking application designs requiring to solve
set-membership problems on a packet basis (§ 3). Our
main contribution consists of assembling and evaluat-
ing a series of practical extensions (i) to increase the
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system performance, (ii) to enable false-negative-free
element deletion, and (iii) to provide security-enhanced
constructs at wire speed (§ 4). Via extensive simula-
tion work, we explore the rich design space and provide
a thorough evaluation of the observed trade-offs (§ 5).
Finally, we relate our contributions to previous work on
Bloom filter designs and briefly discuss the applicability
of the iBF extensions to existing applications (§ 6).
2. Networking applications
iBFs are well suited for applications where one might
like to include a list of elements in every packet, but a
complete list requires too much space. In these situa-
tions, a hash-based lossy representation, like a BF, can
dramatically reduce space, maintaining a fixed header
size, at the cost of introducing false positives when
answering set-membership queries. From its original
higher layer applications such as dictionaries, BFs have
spanned their application domain down to hardware im-
plementations, becoming a daily aid in network applica-
tions (e.g., routing table lookups, DPI, etc.) and future
information-oriented networking proposals [12]. As a
motivation to our work and to get some practical exam-
ples of iBF usages, we first briefly survey a series of
networking applications with the common theme of us-
ing small BFs carried in packets.
2.1. Data path security
The credential-based data path architecture intro-
duced in [5] proposes novel network router security
features. During the connection establishment phase,
routers authorize a new traffic flow request and issue
a set of credentials (aka capabilities) compactly repre-
sented as iBF bit positions. The flow initiator constructs
the credentials by including all the router signatures into
an iBF. Each router along the path checks on packet ar-
rival for presence of its credentials, i.e., the k bits result-
ing from hashing the packet 5-tuple IP flow identifier
and the routers (secret) identity. Hence, unauthorized
traffic and flow security violations can be probabilisti-
cally avoided per hop in a stateless fashion. Using 128
bits only, the iBF-based authorization token reduces the
probability that attack traffic reaches its destination to a
fraction of a percent for typical Internet path lengths.
2.2. Wireless sensor networks
A typical attack by compromised sensor nodes con-
sists of injecting large quantities of bogus sensing
reports, which, if undetected, are forwarded to the
data collector(s). The statistical en-route filtering ap-
proach [6] proposes a detection method based on an
iBF representation of the report generation (collection
of keyed message authentications), that is verified prob-
abilistically and dropped en-route in case of incorrect-
ness. The iBF-based solution uses 64 bits only and
is able to filter out 70% of the injected bogus reports
within 5 hops, and up to 90% within 10 hops along the
paths to the data sink.
2.3. IP traceback
The packet-marking IP traceback method proposed
in [9] relies on iBFs to trace an attack back to its approx-
imate source by analyzing a single packet. On packet
arrival, routers insert their mark (IP mask) into the iBF,
enabling a receiver to reconstruct probabilistically the
packet path(s) by testing for iBF presence of neighbor-
ing router addresses.
2.4. Loop prevention
In Icarus [10], a small iBF is initialized with 0s and
gets filled as forwarding elements includes adding the
Bloom masks (size m, k bits set to 1) of the interfaces
they pass to the iBF. If the OR operation does not change
the iBF, then the packet might be looping and should
be dropped. If the Bloom filter changes, the packet is
definitely not looping.
2.5. IP multicast
Revisiting the case of IP multicast, the authors of [7]
propose inserting an iBF above the IP header to rep-
resent domain-level paths of multicast packets. After
discovering the dissemination tree of a specific multi-
cast group, the source border router searches its inter-
domain routing table to find the prefixes of the group
members. It then builds an 800-bit shim header by in-
serting the path labels (AS a : AS b) of the dissemination
tree into the iBF. Forwarding routers receiving the iBF
check for presence of next hop autonomous systems and
forward the packet accordingly.
2.6. Source routing & multicast
The LIPSIN [8] forwarding fabric leverages the idea
of having interface identifiers in BF-form (m-bit Link
ID with only k bits set to 1). A routing iBF can then be
constructed by ORing the different Link IDs represent-
ing a source route. Forwarding nodes maintain a small
Link ID table whose entries are checked for presence in
the routing iBF to take the forwarding decision. In addi-
tion to stateless multicast capabilities, a series of exten-
sions are proposed to have a practical and scalable net-
working approach (e.g., virtual links, fast recovery, loop
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detection, false positive blocking, IP inter-networking,
etc.). Using a 256-bit iBF in a typical WAN topology,
multicast trees containing around 40 links can be con-
structed to reach in a stateless fashion up to 24 users
while maintaining the false positive rate (≈ 3%) and the
associated forwarding efficiency within reasonable per-
formance levels.
3. Basic design
The basic notation of an iBF is equivalent to the stan-
dard BF, that is an array of length m, k independent hash
functions, and number of inserted elements n. For the
sake of generality, we refer simply to elements as the
objects identified by the iBF and queried by the network
processing entities. Depending on the specific iBF net-
working application, elements may take different forms
such as interface names, IP addresses, certificates, and
so on.
On insertion, the element is hashed to the k hash val-
ues and the corresponding bit positions are set to 1. On
element check, if any of the bits determined by the hash
outputs is 0, we can be sure that the element was not
inserted (no false negative property). If all the k bits
are set to 1, we have a probabilistic argument to be-
lieve that the element was actually inserted. The case
of collisions to bits set by other elements causing a non-
inserted element to return “true” is referred to as a false
positive. In different networking applications, false pos-
itives manifest themselves with different harmful effects
such as bandwidth waste, security risks, computational
overhead, etc. Hence, a system design goal is to keep
false positives to a minimum.
3.1. False positive estimates
It is well-known that the a priori false positive esti-
mate, f pb, is the expected false positive probability for
a given set of parameters (m,n,k) before element addi-
tion:
f pb =
1 −
(
1 − 1
m
)k∗n
k
(1)
The number k, that minimizes the false positive proba-
bility, can be obtained by setting the partial derivative
of f pb with respect to k to 0. This is attained when
k = ln(2) ∗ m
n
, and is rounded to an integer to determine
the optimal number of hash functions to be used [1].
While Eq. 1 has been extensively used and experi-
mentally validated as a good approximation, for small
values of m the actual false positive rate can be much
larger. Recently, Bose et al. [13] have shown that f pb
is actually only a lower bound, and a more accurate es-
timate can be obtained by formulating the problem as a
balls-into-bins experiment:
pk,n,m =
1
mk(n+1)
m∑
i=1
iki!
(
m
i
) {
kn
i
}
(2)
which, according to [13, Theorem 4], can be lower-
and upper-bounded as follows:
pk < pk,n,m < pk
1 + O
 kn
√
lnm − klnp
m

 (3)
The difference of the observed false positive rate and
the theoretical estimates can be significant for small size
BFs, a fact that we (and others) have empirically ob-
served (see evaluation in §5.1.2). Hence, iBFs are prone
to more false positives than traditional BFs for equiva-
lent m/n ratios but larger values of m.
Both the definition of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 do not involve
knowing exactly how many bits are actually set to 1. A
more accurate estimate can be given once we know the
fill factor ρ; that is the fraction of bits that are actually
set to 1 after all elements are inserted. We can define the
posterior false positive estimate, f pa, as the expected
false positive probability after inserting the elements:
f pa = ρk (4)
Finally, the observed false positive probability is the ac-
tual false positive rate ( f pr) that is observed when a
number of queries are made:
f pr = Observed false positives
Tested elements (5)
Note that the f pr is an experimental quantity computed
via simulation or system measurements and not a theo-
retical estimate. Hence, the f pr is the key performance
indicator we want to measure in a real system, where
every observed false positive will cause some form of
degradation. Therefore, practitioners are less interested
in the asymptotic bounds of the hash-based data struc-
ture and more concerned with the actual false positive
rates, especially in the space-constrained scenario of
tiny iBFs.
3.2. Naming and operations
A nice property of hash-based data structures is that
the performance is independent from the form of the in-
serted elements. Independently of its size or represen-
tation, every element carried in the iBF contributes with
at most k bits set to 1. In order to meet the line speed
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requirements on iBF operations, a design recommenda-
tion is to have the elements readily in a pre-computed
BF-form (m-bit vector with k bits set to 1), avoiding
thereby any hashing at packet processing time. Ele-
ment insertion becomes a simple, parallelizable bitwise
OR operation. Analogously, an iBF element check can
be performed very efficiently in parallel via fast bitwise
AND and COMP operations.
A BF-ready element name, also commonly referred
to as element footprint, can be stored as an m-bit bit
vector or, for space efficiency, it can take a sparse rep-
resentation including only the indexes of the k bit posi-
tions set to 1. In this case, each element entry requires
only k ∗ log2(m) bits.
4. Extensions
In this section, we describe three useful extensions to
basic Bloom filter designs in order to address the fol-
lowing practical issues of iBFs:
(i) Performance: Element Tags exploit the notion of
power of choices in combining hashing-based el-
ement names to select the best iBF according to
some criteria, for instance, less false positives.
(ii) Deletion: Deletable Regions introduce an addi-
tional header to code collision-free zones, en-
abling thereby safe (false-negative-free) element
removals at an affordable packet header bit space.
(iii) Security: Secure Constructs use packet-specific
information and distributed time-based secrets to
provide protection from iBF replay attacks and bit
pattern analysis, preventing attackers from misus-
ing iBFs or trying to infer the identities of the in-
serted elements.
4.1. Element Tags
The concept of element Tags (eTags) is based on
extending BF-compatible element naming with a set
of equivalent footprint candidates. That is, instead of
each element being identified with a single footprint,
every element is associated with d alternative names,
called eTags, uniformly computed by applying some
system-wide mapping function (e.g., k ∗ d hash func-
tions). That allows us to construct iBFs that can be op-
timized in terms of the false positive rate and/or com-
pliance with element-specific false positive avoidance
strategies. Hence, for each element, there are d differ-
ent eTags, where d is a system parameter that can vary
depending on the application. As we see later, a practi-
cal value of d is in the range of multiples of 2 between
2 and 64.
We use the notion of power of choices [14] and take
advantage of the random distribution of the bits set to 1
to select the iBF representation among the d candidates
that leads to a better performance given a certain opti-
mization goal (e.g., lower fill factor, avoidance of spe-
cific false positives). This way, we follow a similar ap-
proach to the Best-of-N method applied in [15], with the
main differences of (1) a distributed application scenario
where the d value is carried in the packet header, and
(2) the best candidate selection criterion is not limited
to the least amount of bits set but includes any system
optimization criteria (e.g., § 5.2 bit deletability), includ-
ing those that involve counting false positives against a
training set (e.g. § 4.1.2 fpr-based selection).
The caveats of this extension are, first, it requires
more space to store element names, and second, the
value d needs to be stored in the packet header as well,
consuming bits that could be used for the iBF. However,
knowing the d value at element query time is fundamen-
tal to avoid checking multiple element representations.
Upon packet arrival, the iBF and the corresponding eTag
entries can be ANDed in parallel.
4.1.1. Generation of eTags
To achieve a near uniform distribution of 1s in the
iBF, k independent hash functions per eTag are required.
In general, k may be different for each eTag, allowing to
adapt better to different fill factors and reducing the false
positives of more sensitive elements. Using the double
hashing technique [16] to compute the bits set to 1 in
the d eTags, only two independent hash functions are
required without any increase of the asymptotic false
positive probability. That is, we rely on the result of
Kirsch and Mitzenmacher [16] on linear combination of
hash functions, where two independent hash functions
and can be used to simulate i random hash functions of
the form:
gi(x) = [h1(x) + i ∗ h2(x)] mod m (6)
As long as h1(x) and h2(x) are system wide parameters,
only sharing i = d ∗ k integers is required to derive the
eTags for any set of elements. For space efficiency, an-
other optimization for the sparse representation of the
candidates consists of defining the d eTags by combina-
tions among k + x iBF positions, i.e., d =
(
k+x
k
)
.
4.1.2. Candidate selection
Having “equivalent” iBF candidates enables to de-
fine a selection criteria based on some design-specific
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objectives. To address performance by reducing false
positives, we can select the candidate iBF that presents
the best posterior false positive estimate (fpa-based se-
lection; Eq. 4). If a reference test set is available to
count for false positives, the iBF choice can be done
based on the lowest observed rate (fpr-based selection;
Eq. 5). Another type of selection policy can be specified
to favor the candidate presenting less false positives for
certain “system-critical” elements (element-avoidance-
based selection).
4.1.3. False positive improvement estimate
Following the same analysis as in [15], the potential
gain in terms of false positive reduction due to selecting
the iBF candidate with fewer 1s can be obtained by es-
timating the least number of bits set after d independent
random variable experiments (see Appendix B for the
mathematical details). Fig. 1 shows the expected gains
when using the fpa-based selection after generating d
candidate iBF for a given element set. With a few dozen
candidates, one can expect a factor 2 improvement in the
observed f pr when selecting the candidate with fewer
ones. Note that the four iBF configurations plotted in
Fig. 1 have the same m/n ratio. In line with the argu-
ments of [13], smaller bit vectors start with a slightly
larger false positive estimate. However, as shown in
Fig. 1(b), the f pr improvement factor of smaller iBFs
due to the d-eTag extension is larger. Hence, especially
for small iBFs, computing d candidates can highly im-
prove the false positive behavior, a fact that we have
validated experimentally in § 5.
4.2. Deletable Regions
Under some circumstances, a desirable property of
iBFs is to enable element deletions as the iBF packet
is processed along network nodes. For instance, this
is the case when some inserted elements are to be pro-
cessed only once (e.g., a hop within a source route), or,
when bit space to add more elements is required. Un-
fortunately, due to its compression nature, bit collisions
hamper naive element removals unless we can tolerate
introducing false negatives into the system. To over-
come this limitation (with high probability), so-called
counting Bloom filters (CBF) [17] were proposed to ex-
pand each bit position to a cell of c bits. In a CBF, each
bit vector cell acts as a counter, increased on element
insertion and decreased on element removal. As long
as there is no counter overflow, deletions are safe from
false negatives. The main caveat is the c times larger
space requirements, a very high price for the tiny iBFs
under consideration.
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Figure 1: False positive probability gains of the power of choices ex-
tension.
The key idea is to keep track of where the collisions
occur at element insertion time. By using the property
that bits set to 1 by just one element (collision-free bits)
are safely deletable, the proposed extension consists of
encoding the deletable regions as part of the iBF header.
Then, an element can be effectively removed if at least
one of its bits can be deleted. Again, this extension
should consume a minimum of bits from the allocated
iBF space. A straightforward coding scheme is to di-
vide the iBF bit vector into r regions of m′/r bits each,
where m′ is the original m minus the extension header
bits. As shown in Fig. 2, this extension uses r bits to
code with 0 a collision-free region and with 1 otherwise
(non-deletable region). The probability of element dele-
tion i.e. n elements having at least one bit in a collision-
free region, can be approximated to (see Appendix A
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Figure 2: An example of the DlBF with m = 32, k = 3 and r = 4,
representing the set x, y, z. The 1s in the first r bits indicate that a
collision happen in the corresponding region and bits therein cannot
be deleted. Since each element has at least one bit in a collision-free
zone, all of them are deletable.
for the mathematical details):
pdr = 1 −
(
n
2
) (
k
r(m − r)
)
(7)
Plotting pdr against the number of regions r (see
Fig. 3(a)) confirms the intuition that increasing r results
in a larger proportion of elements being deletable. As
more elements are inserted into the iBF, the number of
collisions increase and the deletion capabilities (bits in
collision-free regions) are reduced (see Fig. 3(b)). As
a consequence, the target element deletion probability
pdr and the number of regions r establish a practical
limitation on the capacity of nmax deletable iBFs.
From a performance perspective, enabling deletions
comes at the cost of r bits from the iBF bit space. How-
ever, removing already processed elements decreases
the fill factor and consequently reduces the probability
of false positives upfront. Later in § 5.2 we explore the
trade-offs between the overhead of coding the deletable
regions, the impact on the f pr, and the implications of
the candidate selection criteria.
4.3. Secure Constructs
The hashing nature of iBFs provides some inherent
security properties to obscure the identities of the in-
serted elements from an observer or attacker. However,
we have identified a series of cases where improved se-
curity means are desirable. For instance, an attacker is
able to infer, with some probability, whether two pack-
ets contain an overlapping set of elements by simple in-
specting the bits set to 1 in the iBFs. In another case,
an attacker may wait and collect a large sample of iBFs
to infer some common patterns of the inserted elements.
In any case, if the attacker has knowledge of the com-
plete element space (and the eTags generation scheme),
he/she can certainly try a dictionary attack by testing
for presence of every element and obtain a probabilistic
answer to what elements are carried in a given iBF. A
similar problem has been studied in [18] to secure stan-
dalone BFs representing a summary of documents by
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Figure 3: Deletability probability (m=256).
using keyed hash functions. Our approach does not dif-
fer at the core of the solution i.e. obscuring the result-
ing bit patterns in the filter by using additional inputs
to the hashes. However, our attention is focused to the
specifics of distributed, line-speed iBF operations.
The main idea to improve the security is to bind
the iBF element insertion to (1) an invariant of the
packet or flow (e.g., IP 5-tuple, packet payload, etc.),
and (2) system-wide time-based secret keys. Basi-
cally, the inserted elements become packet- and time-
specific. Hence, an iBF gets expirable and meaning-
ful only if used with the specific packet (or authorized
packet flow), avoiding the risk of an iBF replay attack,
where the iBF is placed as a header on a different packet.
4.3.1. Binding to packet contents
We strive to provide a lightweight, bit mixing func-
tion O = F(K, I) to make an element name K dependent
on additional in-packet information I. For this exten-
sion, an element name K is an m-bit hash output and
6
Algorithm 1: Secure iBF element set/check algo-
rithm.
Input: element name K, packet-specific id. I,
param. d
Output: k bit positions to be set/checked
1.- Let O = k ⊗ I
2.- Divide O into k segments of m/k bits:
O1,O2, ...,Ok
3.- Divide each O j into a c ∗ log2(m) bit matrix:
O j1,O j2, ...,O jc where c = ⌈ mk∗log2(m) ⌉
4.- foreach O j ∈ [O1, ...,Ok] do
Set/check bit position i in the iBF where:
i = O j1 ⊗ O j2 ⊗ ... ⊗ O jc
i << d
end
not the eTag representation with only k bits set to 1. The
function F should be fast enough to be done at packet
processing time over the complete set of elements to be
queried by a node processing the iBF. The output O is
the k bit positions to be set/checked in the iBF. Using
true hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA1) as F becomes
unpractical if we want to avoid multiple (one per ele-
ment) cycle-intense hashing per packet.
As an example resource-efficient implementation of
F, we propose the lightweight Algorithm 1 to mix each
element key K with a fixed bit string I. Taking I as an
input, the algorithm runs in parallel on each element K
and returns the k bit positions in the iBF to be set or
checked. After an initial bitwise XOR operation (Step
1), the output O is divided into k segments of m/k bits
(Step 2). To build the folding matrix in Step 3, each
segment is transformed into a matrix of c∗log2(m) bits.1
For instance, with m = 256 and k = 4, each segment
Ok would be a 64-bit bit vector transformed into a 8x8
matrix. Finally, each of the k output values is computed
by XORing the rows of each matrix into a log2(m) bit
value that returns the bit position to be set/checked (Step
4). The last d-bit shifting operation enables the power
of choices capabilities.
We are faced with the classic trade-off between se-
curity and performance. An heuristic evaluation sug-
gests that the proposed F provides a good balance be-
tween performance and security. First, F involves only
bit shifting and XOR operations that can be done in a
1Note that depending on the values of m and k, some padding bits
(e.g., re-used from within the segment) may be required to complete
the matrix.
few clock cycles in parallel for every K. Second, the k
bit positions depend on all the bits, within an m/k bit
segment, from the inputs I and K. The security of F de-
pends on how well I and K are mixed. For security sen-
sitive applications, the XOR operation in Step 1 should
be replaced with a more secure transformation P(K, I)
i.e., using a lightweight cipher or hash function. In gen-
eral, F should take the application specifics into account
(e.g., nature of K, computation of I per-packet) and the
target security level.
4.3.2. Time-based keyed hashing
A more elaborate security extension consists of using
a keyed element name construction, and change the se-
cret key S (t) regularly. We can S (t) as the output of a
pseudo random function S i = F(seed, ti), where seed is
the previous seed value and t a time-based input. Then,
we can include the current S value in the algorithm
for element check/insertion e.g., O = F(K, I, S (t)).
Thereby, we have a periodically updated, shared secret
between iBF issuers and iBF processing entities, with
the benefit that an iBF cannot be re-utilized after a cer-
tain period of time or after an explicit re-keying request.
Moreover, by accepting S i and S i−1 the system requires
only loose synchronization similar to commercial time-
coupled token generators. At the cost of initial syn-
chronization efforts and computational overhead, this
method provides an effective countermeasure to protect
the system from compromised iBF attacks (cf., DDoS
protection with self-routing capabilities [19]).
4.4. Density factor
Another iBF security measure, also proposed in [5],
is to limit the percentage of 1s in the iBF to 50-75%.
A density factor ρmax can safely be set to k ∗ nmax/m,
as each legitimate element contributes with at most k
bits. Then, the probability of an attacker guessing a bit
combination causing a single false positive can be upper
bounded by ρkmax.
5. Practical evaluation
In this section, we turn our attention to the practi-
cal behavior of the iBF in function of the multiple de-
sign parameters and carry out extensive simulation work
to validate the usefulness of the three extensions under
consideration. For these purposes, we use randomly
generated bit strings as input elements and the double
hashing technique using SHA1 and MD5. The section
concludes exploring briefly the potential impact of dif-
ferent types of iBF elements (flat labels, IP addresses,
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dictionary entries) and the hash function implementa-
tion choice.
5.1. Element Tags
We are interested in evaluating the gains of the power
of choices that underpins the element Tag extension
(§ 4.1), where any element set can be equivalently rep-
resented by d different iBFs, different in their bit distri-
bution but equivalent with regard to the carried element
identities. We first explore the case where k = 5 and
then the impact of using a distribution around 5 for can-
didate naming.2
5.1.1. Power of choices (d)
We run the simulations varying d from 2 to 64 and
updating m accordingly to to reflect the overhead of in-
cluding the value d in the packet header. Fig. 4 com-
pares the observed f pr for different values of d. We
see that by increasing d and choosing the candidate
iBF just by observing its fill factor after construction
(Fig. 4(a)) leads to better performing iBFs. In the re-
gion where the iBF is more filled (30-40 elements), the
observed f pr drops between 30% and 50% when 16 or
more candidate iBFs are available. Another interpreta-
tion is that for a maximal target f pr we can now insert
more elements. As expected, the performance gain is
more significant if we consider the best performing iBF
candidate after testing for false positives. Observing
Fig. 4(b), the number of false positives is approximately
halved when comparing the best iBF among 16 or more
against a standard 256-bit iBF. In general, we note that
the observed f pr is slightly larger than the commonly
assumed theoretical estimate (Eq. 1), confirming thus
the findings by [13] (Eq. 4). This difference is more no-
ticeable for small values of m and becomes negligible
for values larger than 1024 (see Table 1).
5.1.2. Distribution of the number of hash functions (k)
Now, we allow a different number of bits k per can-
didate. For instance, with d = 8 the distribution of k
among the candidates is [4,4,5,5,6,6,7,7]. Intuitively,
this naming scheme adapts better to the total number
of elements in the iBF (k closer to kopt = ln(2) ∗ mn ).
The fpa-based selection criterion (§ 4.1) is now choos-
ing the candidate with the lowest estimate after hash-
ing: min{ρ0k0 , . . . , ρdkd }. Fig. 5(a) shows the distribu-
tion of the selected 256-bit iBFs for the case of d = 16
2We choose k = 5 to have a probabilistically sufficient footprint
space for the eTags (m!/(m−k)! ≈ 1012 with m = 256) when targeting
an m/n of about 8 bits per element.
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Figure 4: Power of choice gains (m=256, k=5).
and k evenly distributed between 4 and 7. The line
shows the percentage of times that the selected iBF actu-
ally yielded the best performance among the candidates.
Disregarding the scenarios with fewer elements, the fpa-
based selection criteria succeeded to choose the optimal
candidate in about 30% of the times. Fig. 5(b) shows the
percentile distribution of the best performing iBF after
f pr testing. As expected, in more filled iBFs scenarios,
setting less bits per element is beneficial. However, the
differences are relatively small. As shown in Table 1,
the observed f pr in the case of kconst. = 5 is practically
equivalent (if not slightly better) to the case where k is
distributed. We can also observe what the theory in § 2
predicts with regard to smaller iBFs and (i) their inferior
f pr performance for the same m/n ratio, and (ii) their
larger potential to benefit from the power of choices.
5.1.3. Discussion
Based on our experimental evaluation, having more
than 32 candidates per element does not seem to bring
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benefits in terms of performance. If the system design
choice is based on selection criteria optimized for the
non-presence of specific false positives (i.e. element-
avoidance § 4.1), increasing the number of choices d
allows complying to a larger set of false positive avoid-
ance policies. The practical limitation appears to be
solely how much space to store the candidate element
representations the application designer is willing to
pay.
5.2. Deletion
We explore two important aspects of the deletable re-
gions extension. First, from a qualitative point of view
we examine the actual capabilities to successfully delete
elements for different m/n ratios, number of regions r
and choices d. Second, we evaluate the quantitative
gains in terms of false positive reduction after element
bits are deleted. Obviously, both aspects are related and
intertwined with the ability to choose among candidate
Table 1: Observed f pr for iBFs with 16 eTag choices.
m n
Std. (%) fpa-opt. (%) fpr-opt. (%)
Th. f pr kcte kdst kcte kdst
128
6 0.04 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.05
12 0.75 1.12 0.88 0.86 0.37 0.32
18 3.33 4.39 2.80 3.10 2.18 2.37
256
12 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.03
24 0.74 0.95 0.74 0.71 0.26 0.30
36 3.31 3.63 2.69 2.75 2.07 2.15
512
24 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01
48 0.74 0.83 0.64 0.64 0.22 0.25
72 3.29 3.46 2.87 3.05 2.09 2.21
iBF representations to favor the deletion capabilities.
Now, the application can choose the iBF candidate with
the most number of bits set in collision free-zones, in-
creasing thus the bit deletability. Alternatively, one may
want to favor the element deletability, recalling that re-
moving a single element bit is traduced into a practical
deletion of the element.
Using our basic coding scheme (§ 4.2), we consume
one bit per region to code whether collision happened
and deletion is prohibited or not. Thus, the bits available
for iBF construction are reduced to m′ = m− log2(d)−r.
5.2.1. Quality
We now evaluate how many of the inserted elements
can be safely removed in practice. Fig. 6(a) plots the
percentage of elements that can be deleted. As ex-
pected, partitioning the iBF into more regions results in
a larger fraction of elements (bits) becoming deletable.
For instance, in the example of a 256-bit iBF with 32
regions (Fig. 6), when 24 elements are inserted, we
are able to delete an average of more than 80% of the
elements by safely removing around 50% of the bits
(Fig. 6(b)). Playing with the candidate choices, we
can enhance the bit (Fig. 7(a)) and element (Fig. 7(b))
deletability considerably. Finally, we were able to vali-
date experimentally the mathematical model of the ele-
ment deletability probability (Eq. 7).
5.2.2. Quantity
Next, we explore the f pr gains due to bit deletability.
On one hand, we have the potential gains of removing
bits from collision-free zones. On the other, the cost of
(1) coding the deletable regions (r bits), and (2) having
more filled iBFs due to the rarefication of colliding bits.
While Fig. 8(a) shows the price of having to code more
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Figure 6: Deletability as function of r (m=256).
regions, Fig. 8(b) illustrates the potential gains of re-
moving evert deletable bits are removed. If we average
the f pr before and after elements are deleted, the iBF
performance appears equivalent to the f pr of a stan-
dard non-deletable m-bit iBF. In comparison, a count-
ing BF with 2 bits per cell3 would behave like an iBF
of size m/2, which would have its element capacity ac-
cordingly constrained.
Analyzing the power of choices, Fig. 9 confirms the
intuition that choosing the best deletable iBF candi-
date causes the colliding bits to “thin out” (greater ρ),
yielding a higher f pr before deletion (Fig. 9(a)) and a
smaller f pr after elements are removed (Fig. 9(b)).
5.2.3. Discussion
There is a tussle between having a smaller fill factor
ρ, with more collisions at construction time reducing the
3Using the power of choices, we could have with very high proba-
bility a candidate that does not exceed the counter value of 3, avoiding
false negatives as long as no new additions are considered.
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Figure 7: Deletability as f(d). m=256, r=16.
f pa, and the deletability extension that benefits from
fewer collisions. Deletability may be a key property for
some system designs, for instance, whenever an element
in the iBF should be processed only once and then be re-
moved, or when space is needed to add new elements on
the fly. A more detailed evaluation requires taking the
specific application dynamics (e.g., frequency of dele-
tions/insertions) into consideration.
From a f pr performance perspective, the cost of cod-
ing the deletable regions is only a slight increase in the
f pr due to r being only a fraction of m. However, this
practical bit space reduction seems to hinder, on aver-
age, the potential f pr gains due to bit deletions up-
front. Nevertheless, the deletable regions extension is
a far more attractive approach to enable deletions in the
space-constrained iBFs than alternative solutions based
on counting BFs. An open question is whether we are
able to find a more space-efficient coding scheme for
the deletable regions. Finally, the power of choices
again proved to be a very handy technique to deal with
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the probabilistic nature of hash-based data structures,
enabling candidate selection for different criteria (e.g.,
f pr, element/bit deletability).
5.3. Security
Besides fast computation, the main requirements for
the security extension are that (i) the random distribu-
tion of the iBF bits is conserved, and (ii) given a collec-
tion of packets I and the securely constructed iBFs, one
cannot easily reveal information about the inserted ele-
ments (K). More generally, given a set of (I, iBF) pairs,
it must be at best very expensive to retrieve information
about the identities of K.
We first measured the randomness of the secure iBF
construction outputs from Algorithm 1 by fixing a set
of 20 elements and changing the per-packet 256-bit ran-
domly generated I value on each experiment run. Ta-
ble 2 gathers the average results of 100 experiments
with 1000 runs per experiment. The observed distri-
bution of outputs within an experiment, measured as
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the Hamming distance between output bit vectors (BV),
was very close to the mean value of m/2 bits (128) with
a small standard deviation.4 The observed average num-
ber of bits set and their distribution were comparable
to standard iBF constructs. Additionally, we analyzed
whether the 20 most frequent bit positions set in secure
iBFs corresponded to bits set in plain iBFs. We defined
the correlation factor as the fraction of matches and ob-
tained a value of 0, 371, which is close to the probability
of randomly guessing bits in a 256-bit iBF with k = 4
and n = 20 elements (Pr ≈ 96/256 ≈ 0, 37).
The results indicate that, assuming a random packet
identifier I, first, no actual patterns can be inferred from
the securely inserted elements, and second, the random
bit distribution of an iBF is conserved when using the
4In future work we will extend these results and the
hashing techniques evaluation of Sec. 5.4 with other ran-
domness tests such as those included in the Diehard suite
(http://www.stat.fsu.edu/pub/diehard).
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proposed algorithm. However, we recognize the limi-
tations of Alg. 1. For instance, if provable protection
against more elaborated attacks is required, then, a more
secure and computationally expensive bit mixing proce-
dure (Step 1 in Alg. 1) should be considered, in addition
to a time-based shared secret as suggested in § 4.3.
Sec. iBF Plain iBF Random BV
Hamming dist. 127.94 (8.06) 0 127.95 (8.03)
# bits set 96.27 (3.20) 96.29 (-) 127.97 (7,97)
Correlation 0.371 -
Table 2: Evaluation of the secure iBF algorithm (m=256, k=4, n=20).
Avg. (Stdev) after 1000 runs.
5.4. Hashing technique
Finally, we briefly investigate the impacts of the hash
function implementation choice and the nature of the
input elements in small size iBFs. There are two fac-
tors that determine the “quality” of the bit distribution
and consequently may impact the observed f pr: 1) the
input bit string, and 2) the implementation of the hash
function.
5.4.1. Input data sets
Instead of considering elements as simple random bit
strings, we now explore three types of elements that
cover typical inputs of iBF applications:
• 32-bit IP addresses: Nearly 9M IP addresses
were generated by expanding the subnet values of
IP prefixes advertised in the CAIDA database.5
In addition, private IP addresses (10.0.0.0/16,
192.168.0.0/16) were also used in the experiments.
• 256-bit random labels: A set of 3M random la-
bels was generated constructing each 256-bit label
by picking randomly 64 hex characters and check-
ing for uniqueness.
• Variable-bit dictionary words: A set formed by
98.568 entries of the American dictionary.6
5.4.2. Hash function choice
We chose 3 commonly used cryptographic hash func-
tions (MD5, SHA1 and SHA256) and 2 general purpose
hash functions (CRC32 and BOB).7
5ftp.ripe.net/ripe/stats/delegated-ripencc-20090308
6/usr/share/dict/american-english
7Related work has investigated the properties of 25 popular hash
functions, pointing to BOB as a fast alternative that yields excellent
The observed f pr (Table 3) imply that, on average,
the input type does not affect the iBF performance. Fig-
ure 10 plots the observed normalized sample variance
for different bit vector sizes (m). For lower m values the
variances show a larger difference and start converging
for m > 512. CRC presents the best output distribution
when dealing with IP addresses as inputs. This may be
explained by the 32-bit match of inputs and outputs. In
general, the functions exhibit similar behavior, leading
to the conclusion that all 5 hash functions can be used in
iBF scenarios independently from the nature of the ele-
ments. This result experimentally confirms, also in the
case small m values, the observation by Mitzenmacher
and Vadhal [21] that given a certain degree of random-
ness in the input, simple hash functions work well in
practice.
n DoubleHash IP Random Dict.
16 SHA1&MD5 0.340 (0.035) 0.338 (0.032) 0.328 (0.034)CRC32 segm. 0.345 (0.037) 0.349 (0.034) 0.338 (0.034)
32 SHA1&MD5 2.568 (0.436) 2.576 (0.449) 2.519 (0.385)CRC32 segm. 2.541 (0.418) 2.532 (0.403) 2.570 (0.444)
Table 3: Observed f pr in 256-bit iBF using double hashing with
SHA1 & MD5 and with 8-bit segments of CRC32. Avg. (StdDev);
1000 tests.
5.4.3. Hash segmentation technique
We note that for the purposes of iBF construction,
there is a waste of hash output bits due to the mod m
residual restrictions. Hence, we want to know whether
we can divide the output of a hash function into log2(m)
segments and use each segment as an independent hash
value. We compare the bit distribution and f pr per-
formance of iBFs constructed using the double hashing
technique with MD5 and SHA1 against iBFs generated
with CRC32 segments as hi(x). The differences of the
observed f pr (Table 3) are negligible, which suggests
that we may indeed use this hashing technique in prac-
tice. As a practical consequence, we can reduce the two
independent hash function requirement of the double
hashing technique to a single hash computation based
on e.g., CRC32 or BOB. This result can be applied to
iBF networking applications with on-line element hash-
ing instead of pre-computed element names. Moreover,
the hash segmentation technique may be useful in other
multiple-hashing-based data structures (e.g., d-left hash
tables) that require hashing on a packet basis.
randomized outputs for network applications [20]. Although MD5
and SHA1 are considered broken due to the recent discovery of colli-
sions, they are perfectly valid for our randomness purposes.
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Figure 10: Normalized bit distribution variance for different hash
functions.
6. Relevance and related work
Although multiple variants of Bloom filter designs
and applications have been proposed in the last years
(e.g., Bloomier, dynamic, spectral, adaptive, retouched,
etc.), to the best of our knowledge, none of the previ-
ous work focuses on the particular requirements of dis-
tributed networking applications using small Bloom fil-
ters in packet headers.
Prior work on improved Bloom filters include the
Power of Two Choices filter [14] and the Partitioned
Hashing [22], which rely on the power of choices at
hashing time to improve the performance of BFs. False
positives are reduced in [22] by a careful choice of the
group of hash functions that are well-matched to the in-
put elements. However, this scheme is not practical in
distributed, highly dynamic environments. The main
idea of [14] is to reduce the number 1s by choosing
the “best” set of hash functions. Besides our in-packet-
header scope, our approach differs in that we include the
information of which group of hash functions was used
(d value) in the packet itself, avoiding thereby the caveat
of checking multiple sets. On the other hand, we need to
stick to one set of hash functions for all elements in the
BF, whereas in [14] the optimal group of hash functions
can be chosen on an element basis. To our benefit, due
to the reduced bit vector scenario, we are able to select
an optimal BF after evaluating all d candidates, which
leads to improved performance even in very dense BF
settings (small m/n ratios).
Regarding the notion of choosing the best candidate
filter, the Best-of-N method [15] only considers a stan-
dalone application where the best BF selection is based
on the least dense filter constructed with the optimal
number kopt of hash functions is. Our distributed iBF
applications consider candidates with different amount
of bits set (kdistr) as the maximum set cardinality may
be unknown and hashing at packet processing time may
not be an option. Moreover, we note that distributed
iBF applications may (1) be able to test for presence of
elements to be queried upfront and selected the best ob-
served f pr candidate, and (2) selection criteria may be
beyond reducing f pr, for instance benefiting the dele-
tion of elements or avoiding specific false positives.
As far as we can say, our scheme for deleting items
from a BF based on coding the regions where collisions
have happened has not been proposed before. Due to
its space efficiency, the false-negative-free characteris-
tics, and the high probability of successful deletions, the
Deletable Regions extension may have interesting appli-
cations beyond the scope of iBFs. The closest BF design
innovation to support deletions, other than by counting
BFs or d-left fingerprint hash tables, are the Variable-
length Signatures (VBF) by Lu et al [23]. While both
element deletions are based on resetting at least one bit
from an element signature, our scheme introduces no
false negatives at the cost of providing only probabilis-
tic guarantees for element deletion.
Security and privacy preserving extensions for BFs
have been previously studied in [18, 24] and our
main novelty resides in taking distributed systems and
data packets specifics into consideration (e.g., flow-
identifier, time-based loose synchronization of dis-
tributed secrets).
Recently, our work on iBFs has contributed to enable
a novel packet forwarding scheme with built-in DDoS
protection [19]. The notion of element Tags has its roots
in our work on the link identifier based forwarding fab-
ric in [8], rendering the system more useful (network
policy compliance, loop avoidance, security) and effi-
cient ( f pr control, larger multicast groups).Similarly,
the d-eTag extensions may be applied to the case of IP
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multicast [7] to reduce false positives and compliance
to inter-domain AS policies in the case of false posi-
tives. When applied to the credentials based architecture
proposed in [5], multiple candidates may allow iBFs to
transverse larger paths before reaching the maximum
density. Moreover, the security extension may pro-
vide extra protection from an en-route attacker spoof-
ing the source IP address and re-using the flow creden-
tials for unauthorized traffic. Finally, the hash segmen-
tation technique appears useful to lower the burden on
networking elements when computing multiple hashes
on a packet basis.
7. Conclusions
This paper explores an exciting front in the Bloom fil-
ter research space, namely the special category of small
Bloom filters carried in packet headers. Using iBFs is a
promising approach for networking application design-
ers choosing to move application state to the packets
themselves. At the expense of some false positives,
fixed-size iBFs are amenable to hardware and present
a way for new networking applications.
We studied the design space of iBFs in depth and
evaluated new ways to enrich iBF-based networking ap-
plications without sacrificing the Bloom filter simplic-
ity. First, the power of choices extension shows to be
a very powerful and handy technique to deal with the
probabilistic nature of hash-based data structures, pro-
viding finer control over false positives and enabling
compliance to system policies and design optimization
goals. Second, the space-efficient element deletion tech-
nique provides an important (probabilistic) capability
without the overhead of existing solutions like count-
ing Bloom filters and avoiding the limitations of false-
negative-prone BF extensions. Third, security exten-
sions were considered to couple iBFs to time and packet
contents, providing a method to secure iBFs against
tampering and replay attacks. Finally, we have validated
the extensions in a rich simulation set-up, including use-
ful recommendations for efficient hashing implementa-
tions. We hope that this paper motivates the design of
more iBF extensions and new networking applications.
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Appendix A. Mathematical Model for Element
Deletability Probability
Consider a vector of size m, k hash functions and r
regions. The bit vector size to construct the actual BF is
m′ = m − r and the number of bit cells in each region is
equal to ⌈m′/r⌉. The probability of two hash functions
setting a given bit cell:
p1 =
(
1
m′
) (
1
m′
)
=
(
1
m′2
)
(A.1)
If we use one hash function per element (i.e. one bit)
and insert n elements, the probability of having at least
one collision in a given cell is:
p2 =
(
n
2
) (
1
m′2
)
+
(
n
3
) (
1
m′3
)
+ · · · +
(
n
n
) (
1
m′n
)
=
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
) (
1
m′i
)
(A.2)
Considering that each element insertion sets k bits to 1,
we compute the probability to:
p3 =
(
n
2
) (
b1
m′2
)
+
(
n
2
) (
b2
m′2
)
+ · · · +
(
n
2
) (
bk
m′2
)
=
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
) (
k
m′i
)
(A.3)
Equation A.3 considers a collision in a given bit cell.
Now, we extend the probability to the m′/r bit cells in a
single region:
p4 = (1 − p3) m
′
r =
1 −
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
) (
k
m′i
)
m′
r
(A.4)
Replacing m′ with m − r, the probability of an element
being deletable, that is of having at least one bit set in a
collision-free region is:
pdr =
1 −
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
) (
k
m − r2
)
( m−rr )
(A.5)
Finally, neglecting the contributions of the terms for i >
2 as they tend to zero, we get:
pdr ≈
(
1 −
(
n
2
) (
k
m − r2
))( m−rr )
(A.6)
Appendix B. Mathematical model for d-candidate
fpa optimization (adapted from [15])
Given the iBF parameters m, n, k, and letting d be the
number of different iBF candidates for the same element
set, the probability of setting s bits in an iBF candidate
can be formulated as an independent random variable
experiment:
E2 [s] = m
1 −
(
1 − 1
m
)kn+m (m − 1)
1 − 2
(
1 − 1
m
)kn
+
(
1 − 2
m
)kn (B.1)
σ2 [s] = m
(
m − 1
m
)kn
+m2
(
m − 2
m
)kn
+m
(
m − 2
m
)kn
+m2
(
m − 1
m
)2kn
(B.2)
Defining µ = E[s] and σ = σ[s], the minimum con-
tinuous probability density function is:
fmin (s) =
(
1
2d−1
)
d
(
er f c
(
s − µ
σ
√
2
))d−1 ( 1
σ
√
2pi
e
−(s−µ)
2σ2
)
(B.3)
Consequently, the expectation of the least number
bits (smin) set by any of d candidates:
E (S min) =
∫ ∞
−∞
s fmin (s) ds (B.4)
Finally, the probability of a false positive once the
smallest fill ratio has been estimated:
pr
[ f alsepositive] =
(
E [smin]
m
k)
(B.5)
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